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Abstract
Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) attacks target telephony services, such as
Voice over IP (VoIP), not allowing legitimate users to make calls. There are few
defenses that attempt to mitigate TDoS attacks, most of them using IP filtering,
with limited applicability. In our previous work, we proposed to use selective
strategies for mitigating HTTP Application-Layer DDoS Attacks demonstrat-
ing their effectiveness in mitigating different types of attacks. Developing such
types of defenses is challenging as there are many design options, e.g., which
dropping functions and selection algorithms to use. Our first contribution is to
demonstrate both experimentally and by using formal verification that selective
strategies are suitable for mitigating TDoS attacks. We used our formal model
to help decide which selective strategies to use with much less effort than car-
rying out experiments. Our second contribution is a detailed comparison of the
results obtained from our formal models and the results obtained by carrying out
experiments. We demonstrate that formal methods is a powerful tool for spec-
ifying defenses for mitigating Distributed Denial of Service attacks allowing to
increase our confidence on the proposed defense before actual implementation.
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1. Introduction
Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) attacks is a type of Denial of Service
(DoS) attack that target telephony services, such as Voice over IP (VoIP). With
the increase in the popularity of VoIP services, we have witnessed an increase
in TDoS attacks being used to target hospital line systems [1, 2] and systems
for emergency lines (like the American 911 system) [3]. According to the FBI,
200 TDoS attacks have been identified only in 2013 [2].
This paper investigates the use of selective defenses [4] for mitigating one
type of TDoS attack called Coordinated Call [5] attack. The Coordinated Call
attack [5] exploits the fact that pairs of attackers, Alice and Bob, can collude to
exhaust the resources of the VoIP server. Assume that Alice and Bob are valid
registered users.1 The attack goes by Alice simply calling Bob and trying to
stay in the call as long as she can. Since the server allocates resources for each
call, by using enough pairs of attackers, attackers can exhaust the resources of
the server denying service to honest participants. This is a simple, but ingenious
attack, as only a relatively low rate of incoming calls is needed generating a small
network traffic (when compared to SIP flooding attack for example). Thus it is
hard for the network administrator to detect and counter-measure such attack.
Formal methods and, in particular, rewriting logic can help developers to
design defenses for mitigating DDoS attacks. In our previous work [4] we used
selective strategies in the form of the tool SeVen for mitigating HTTP Low-
Rate Application-Layer DDoS attacks targeting web-servers. We formalized
different attack scenarios in Maude [6] and since our strategies are constructed
over some probability functions, we used statistical model checking [7], namely
PVeStA [8], to validate our defense. Due to our reasonable preliminary results,
we implemented SeVen and carried out experiments over the network obtaining
similar results to the ones obtained using formal methods. It took us only 3
person months to obtain our results using formal methods, while it took us 24
person months to obtain our first experimental results. Specifying scenarios
using formal verification amounts to coding some few hundred lines of specifica-
tion, while carrying out such experiments on the network amounts to building
complex prototypes to carry out attacks, generate legitimate traffic and deploy
defenses, integrating them with existing machinery, such as VoIP servers, setting
and configuring the network and testing which take much more effort involving a
larger team. Although we strongly believe that systems should also be validated
by means of experiments, the confidence acquired from our formal analysis was
invaluable for the success of this project.2
This paper provides more evidence supporting the claim that formal methods
1This can be easily done for many VoIP services.
2Notice that although our experiments on the network were controlled experiments, they
used off-the-shelf tools, such as Apache web-servers, which implement a number of optimiza-
tions not modeled in our formal specification. Moreover our experiments suffered from inter-
ference that cannot be controlled, such as network latency. The same is true for our results
involving the VoIP server Asterisk used in our experimental results.
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can help specifiers in designing selective defenses. We systematically consider
a number of selective defenses used for mitigating TDoS attacks. We compare
the results obtained using our formal specification and the results obtained
implementing such defenses and carrying out experiments on the network. Our
results show a high accuracy for most of the results, specially on availability,
but less accurate on results involving time measurements.
Our contributions are three-fold:
• We formalized in Maude the Coordinated Call attack and three selective
defenses based on SeVen: the first using a uniform selection strategy, the
second with roulette selection strategy [9], and the third with a tournament
selection strategy [10]. We also considered two models for legitimate call du-
ration: an exponential call duration which models traditional telephony [11]
and lognormal call duration which models VoIP telephony [12].
We carried out a number of simulations using PVeStA to test the efficiency
of each version the defense used under the two different assumptions on call
duration. Our simulation results suggest that SeVen mitigates the Coordi-
nated Call attack;
• We implemented the different selective defenses analysed using our formal
models, and integrated them with the VoIP server Asterisk [13] using the
SIP-protocol. We also implemented the Coordinated Call attack. Our ex-
perimental results demonstrate in practice that our selective defenses can
mitigate the Coordinated Call attack;
• Finally, we compare the results obtained from our formal analysis with the
results obtained from our experimental results to analyze the accuracy of
the results obtained from our formal analysis. This comparison demon-
strates that formal methods are of great value as they can be used early
on to develop and evaluate new defense mechanisms for mitigating TDoS
attacks with much less effort than implementing defenses and carrying out
experiments on the network.
A small subset of experimental and simulation results appearing in this pa-
per appeared in our previous work [14, 15] which only considered scenarios
where call duration followed a uniform probability and a single mechanism for
dropping calls, namely the roulette strategy. This paper extends our previous
work by considering different assumptions on call duration, namely lognormal
distribution, modeling usual VoIP calls, and exponential distribution, modeling
usual telephony, i.e., non VoIP calls. Moreover, we consider here different mech-
anisms for dropping calls, namely uniform, roulette and tournament dropping
strategies. In terms of total time of experiments, the results in this paper add
more than 40 hours of experimental results when compared to the results in our
previous work [14, 15].
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 we review the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) used for initiating a VoIP call and also explain the Coordinated
Call attack. Section 3 describes how SeVen works, while Section 4 details its
formalization in Maude. Sections 5 and 6 contain our simulation and exper-
imental results including our main assumptions, results and discussion of the
results obtained and Section 7 discusses the accuracy of our simulation results.
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Figure 1: Exchange of messages between the server and two users (Alice and Bob) during a
normal execution of the SIP protocol.
We discuss in Section 8 related and future work. The implementation used to
carry out our simulations is available for download at [16].
2. VoIP Protocols and the Coordinated Call Attack
We now review the Session Initiation Protocol [17], which is one of the main
protocols used to establish Voice over IP (VoIP) connections. Figure 1 shows the
message exchanges performed to establish a connection between two registered
users, Alice and Bob, where Alice tries to initiate a conversation with Bob. It
also contains the messages exchanged to terminate the connection.
For initiating a call, Alice sends an INVITE message to the SIP server in-
forming that she wants to call Bob. If Bob or Alice is not registered as valid
users, the server sends a reject message to Alice. Otherwise, the server sends
an INVITE message to Bob.3 At the same time, the server sends a TRYING
message to Alice informing her the server is waiting for Bob’s response to Al-
ice’s invitation. The server waits for a RINGING message from Bob indicating
that Bobs telephone is ringing. Bob might reject the request, in which case the
server informs Alice (not shown in the Figure), or accept the call by sending
the message OK. Finally, the server sends the message OK to Alice who sends
an ACK message back to the server which forwards it to Bob.
At this point, the communication is established and Alice and Bob should
be able to communicate as long as they need/want. (This is represented by
the three ellipses in Figure 1.) The call is then terminated once one of the
parties (Alice) sends a BYE message to the server. The server then sends a
BYE message to the other party (Bob), which then answers with the message
OK, which is forwarded to Alice, and the connection is terminated.
Coordinated VoIP Attack [5]. A pair of colluding attackers, A1 and A2, that
are registered in the VoIP service,4 call each other and stay in the call for
3In fact, we omit some steps carried out by the server to find Bob in the network. This
step can lead to DDoS amplification attacks [18] for which known solutions exists. Such
amplification attacks are not, however, the main topic of this paper.
4Or alternatively two honest users that have been infected to be zombies by some attacker.
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as much time as they can. Once the call is established, the attackers stay
in the call for indefinite time. They might be disconnected by some Timeout
mechanism establishing some time bounds on the amount of time that two users
might call. During the time that A1 and A2 are communicating, they are using
resources of the server. Many VoIP servers have an upper-bound on the number
of simultaneous calls they can handle. If enough pairs of attackers collude,
then the resources of the server can be quickly exhausted. This attack is hard
to detect using network analyzers because the traffic generated by attackers
is similar to the traffic generated by legitimate clients. The attackers follow
correctly the SIP protocol and, moreover, there is no need to generate a large
burst of calls, but rather place calls in a moderate pace. Eventually, the server’s
capacity will be exhausted.
There are many reasons why VoIP devices participate in a Coordinated Call
attack. Pairs of legitimate users may be unsatisfied with the VoIP provider and
participate in such attacks. Attackers may also use botnets with some infected
malware. There has been evidence of the use of botnets in 2007 [19]. Tools
that can place and receive calls (SIPp [20]) and tutorials on the Internet help
automate the steps for carrying out the Coordinated Call attack.
Indeed, we have done so and as we demonstrate in Section 6, the Coordinated
Call attack can reduce considerably availability to levels around 5% without
generating large amount of traffic.
3. Selective Strategies
We proposed in our previous work [4] a new defense mechanism, called
SeVen, for mitigating Application-Layer DDoS attacks (ADDoS) using selective
strategies [21]. An application using selective strategies does not immediately
process incoming messages, but waits for a period of time, TS , called a round.
During a round, SeVen accumulates messages received in an internal buffer.
Normally, this internal buffer reflects the connections of the protected service.
Assume that k is the maximum capacity of the service being protected. For
VoIP servers k is the number of calls that the application can handle simulta-
neously. If the number of messages accumulated reaches k (the size of internal
buffer) and a new incoming request R arrives, SeVen behaves as follows:
1. SeVen decides whether to process R or not based on a probability P1. P1 is
defined using the counter PMod following [22]:
k
k + PMod
At the beginning of the round, we set PMod = 0. PMod is incremented
whenever the application’s capacity is exhausted and a new incoming re-
quest arrives reducing thus the probability of new incoming request being
selected by SeVen during a round. The intuition is that P1 reduces with
the increase of incoming traffic thus reducing the impact of high numbers
of request to the application;
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2. If SeVen decides to process R, then as the application is overloaded, it should
decide which request currently being processed should be dropped. This
decision is governed by P2, a distribution probability which might depend
on the state of the existing request ;
3. Otherwise, SeVen simply drops the request R without affecting the requests
currently being processed and sends a message to the requesting user in-
forming that the service is temporarily unavailable.
At the end of the round, SeVen processes the requests that are in its internal
buffer (surviving the selective strategy) and sends them to the application.
SeVen mitigates attacks only when the maximum capacity of the VoIP server
is reached. When this happens, SeVen has two mechanisms for dropping re-
quests. The first one is by using probability P1 and the other by using P2. The
main goal of the former is to mitigate the impact of volumetric attacks [21].
This is because whenever the defense receives a high volume attack the value of
PMod increases rapidly increasing rapidly the chance of dropping a request. This
is also reflected on the round time TS which is typically in the order of some
hundred milliseconds to avoid PMod from reaching too high values even under
normal traffic. We used TS = 100ms.
As Coordinated Calls do not generate a very large number of requests, the
mechanism using P1 is not the main mitigation mechanism used by SeVen for
this attack, but rather the mechanism using P2. There is, however, much space
for specifying the probability distribution P2 governing SeVen. In [4], we showed
that by using simple uniform distributions for dropping existing requests, SeVen
can be used to mitigate a number of ADDoS attacks using the HTTP protocol,
such as the Slowloris and HTTP POST attacks even in the presence of a large
number of attackers.
For mitigating the Coordinated Call attack described in Section 2, we set
the probability P2, governing which call to be dropped from the internal buffer,
to depend on (1) the status of the call and (2) on the duration of a call. We
consider two types of call status:
• WAITING: A call is WAITING if it has already sent an INVITE message,
but it is still waiting for the responder to join the call, that is, it has not
completed the initiation part of the SIP protocol;
• INCALL: A call is INCALL if the messages of initiation part of SIP have been
completed and the initiator and the responder are already communicating
(or simply in a call).
Thus, any incoming INVITE requests assume the status of WAITING, and these
can change they status to INCALL once the initiation part of SIP is completed.
We assume here that it is preferable to a VoIP server, when overloaded, to
drop WAITING requests than INCALL requests that are communicating not for a
very long duration. In many cases, it is true that interrupting an existing call is
considered to be more damaging to a server reputation than not allowing a user
to start a new call. This could also be modeled by configuring the probability
distributions of SeVen accordingly. To determine whether a call is taking too
long, we assume that the server knows what is the average duration, tM , of
6
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Figure 2: Graph (not in scale) illustrating the behavior of SeVen according to the status of a
call and its duration. pWAIT is the probability of dropping a WAITING call, while pIN the
probability of dropping a INCALL call.
calls.5
The dropping factor of an INCALL request increases exponentially once the
call duration is greater than tM . Figure 2 depicts roughly the dropping factor
used to drop requests. The actual function d (for drop factor) is of the form,
where t is the call duration and α is a parameter:
d(t) =

pWAIT if t = 0
pIN if 0 < t ≤ tM
pWAIT + e
αt/tM if t > tM
(1)
Given this dropping factor, we consider in our analysis three ways for se-
lecting which call to drop. Assume the server has a capacity of k simultaneous
calls. Moreover, assume c1, . . . , ck are the calls currently being processed by
the server and they have dropping factors of, respectively, d1, . . . , dk. We con-
sidered three different selection strategies described in the literature, namely,
uniform [4], roulette [9] and n-tournament [10]:
• Uniform: In this strategy, the dropping factor of a call is not consid-
ered. We select using uniform probability which call is going to be dropped.
Thus any call independent on its duration and status can be selected to be
dropped by SeVen;
• Roulette: In the roulette strategy [9], we select randomly a call ci to
be dropped where the probability of being dropped is proportional to its
dropping factor. Thus in the roulette strategy a call ci has twice the chance
of being dropped than a call cj if di = 2× dj .
For instance, consider k = 4 and that the server is serving the calls c1, c2, c3, c4
with dropping factors 2, 3, 1, 6 respectively. We select using uniform distri-
bution a number r between 0 and 2 + 3 + 1 + 6 = 12. If 0 ≤ r < 2, then
the call c1 is selected, if 2 ≤ r < 5, then the call c2 is selected, if 5 ≤ r < 6,
then the call c3 is selected, and otherwise if 6 ≤ r < 12 then the call c4
is selected. In this way, the call c4 has 6 times more chance to be selected
than the call c3 for example;
• n-Tournament: In the n-tournament strategy [10], we first select n calls
5The value of tM can be obtained by the history of a VoIP provider’s usage.
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randomly using uniform probability to be part of the tournament. Then,
the call to be dropped will be the call with the greatest dropping factor
among the n selected calls. In case there is more than one possible call with
the greatest dropping factor, we select one of them at random.
For instance, in the example above, if n = 2, then we would select randomly
two out of the four calls c1, c2, c3, c4 to participate in the tournament. Say
the calls c2 and c3 are chosen to be part of the tournament. In this case,
the call c2 is selected to be dropped as it has the greatest drop factor.
Notice that if n is chosen to be too low when compared to k, the n-
tournament behaves closer to the uniform dropping strategy. In fact, if
n = 1, then the n-tournament can be shown to be equivalent to the uni-
form dropping strategy. On the other hand, if n is chosen to be too high,
then the n-tournament behaves closer to a deterministic dropping strategy
that selects the call with the greatest dropping factor. Indeed, if k = n,
then the n-tournament strategy is deterministic. In our experiments, we
used n = k/2, that is, a strategy between the uniform and a deterministic
strategy.
While the attackers attempt to stay in a call for very long periods of time,
legitimate clients do not behave so. The literature models legitimate call du-
ration using the following distributions, where the parameters λ, σ and µ are
computed accordingly to the mean call durations assumed tM (see [23] for more
details):
• Exponential: Typical telephony models [11], i.e., not VoIP, assume that
the call duration of legitimate clients follows an exponential density distri-
bution:
f(x, λ) =
{
λe−λx x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
(2)
Since the coordinated call attack can also be carried out in standard tele-
phony systems, we considered call duration following this distribution.
• Lognormal: While standard telephony calls are paid per duration, in VoIP
calls have fixed rates or are even for free. This difference impacts legitimate
call duration which in VoIP follows a lognormal density distribution [12]:
f(x, µ, σ) =
1
xσ
√
2pi
exp
[
− (ln(x)− µ)
2
2σ2
]
. (3)
3.1. Sample Execution
Consider the following application state, Bi, at the beginning of a round and
assume that k = 3, PMod = 0, the current time is 9 and the average call duration
is tM = 5 time units:
B1 = [〈id1,WAITING, undef〉, 〈id2, INCALL, 0.5〉]
〈id, st, tm〉 specifies that the call id has status st and the call started at time
tm where tm is undef whenever st = WAITING. This buffer specifies that id1
is waiting the responding party to answer (with a OK message) his invitation
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request and that id2 is currently in a call. This means that id2 is calling already
for way more than the expected average.
Assume that a message 〈id1,OK〉 at time 9.5 arrives specifying that the
responder of the request id1 answered the call. The buffer is updated to the
following:
B2 = [〈id1, INCALL, 9.5〉, 〈id2, INCALL, 0.5〉]
Then the message 〈id3, INVITE〉 arrives. Since k has not yet been reached,
a new request is inserted in the buffer and the message TRYING is sent to
the requesting user. Notice that the RINGING message is not yet sent to the
responding user. The buffer changes to:
B3 = [〈id1, INCALL, 9.5〉, 〈id2, INCALL, 0.5〉, 〈id3,WAITING, undef〉]
Suppose now that another message m1 = 〈id4, INVITE〉 arrives at time
10.5. As the buffer is now full, it sets PMod to 1 and the application has to
decide whether it will keep m1. SeVen generates a random number in the
interval [0,1] using uniform distribution. Say that this number is less than
3/(3+1), which means that it will select to process m1. However, it has to drop
some existing request. The current requests id1, id2, id3 have dropping factors
following Figure 2:
• id1 has dropping factor pIN to be dropped because it is calling for a duration
less than tM : 10.5− 9.5 < 5;
• id2 has a much higher dropping factor because it is calling for twice tM :
10.5− 0.5 = 2× 5;
• id3 has dropping factor of pWAIT as it has WAITING status.
The application decides which one to drop either using uniform probability, in
which case the dropping factor of requests is not considered, or the roulette
strategy, in which case id2 has a greater probability of being dropped, or the
n-tournament strategy in which case it would depend on n.
Suppose that the application decides to drop id2, which means that the call
is interrupted by the application. The resulting buffer is:
B4 = [〈id1, INCALL, 9.5〉, 〈id4,WAITING, undef〉, 〈id3,WAITING, undef〉]
Assume that now the round time is elapsed. The application sends a RINGING
message to the responder of the requests id3 and id4.
4. Formal Specification
Our specification follows [4, 24, 25] by specifying test scenarios using ac-
tors where attackers, clients, and the server send and receive messages. These
messages are stored in a scheduler that maintains a queue of messages. The
attackers do not take control over the channel. Instead they share a channel
with the clients.
We formalize all actors in Maude [6] and carry out simulations by using the
statistical model checker PVeStA [8]. For simplicity, we considered the server
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and SeVen as one actor, which means that SeVen is also able to operate as
a normal SIP Server, e.g., processing and establishing call connections. Such
decision does not affect the analysis of our results as in practice SeVen and the
VoIP server are in the same machine and thus share a quick communication
channel. In the following, we describe our Maude specification. The complete
model can be found in [16].
We refer to [6, 26] for a more detailed description of Maude and its underlying
foundations on Rewriting Logic.
4.1. Key Sorts and Functions
Actor. The elements of the sort Actor is constructed by the operator
op <name:_|_> : Address AttributeSet -> Actor .
which takes an Address, which can be a string, and a set of attributes, AttributeSet.
In our formalization, we use the following attributes:
op req-cnt:_ : Float -> Attribute .
op b-set:_ : NBuffer -> Attribute .
op server:_ : Address -> Attribute .
op status:_ : Status -> Attribute
The attribute req-cnt stores the value of PMod, b-set stores the internal buffer
of the server of sort NBuffer and server stores the address of the server. Finally,
the attribute status specifies the status of the call which may be any of the
following state constants:
• none – a call that has not yet been placed;
• invite – a call that has been placed and is waiting for the responder to
answer;
• incall – a call where the participants are currently communicating;
• complete – a call that has been completed, i.e., the parties have communi-
cated for the expected time;
• incomplete – a call that was interrupted while communicating by SeVen.
The SeVen buffer has sort NBuffer and is constructed by pairing a number
and a buffer:
op [_|_] : Nat Buffer -> NBuffer .
The number specifies the elements in the buffer which is a list of elements of
sort EleBuf. These elements are constructed using a 3-tuple of the form:
op <___> : Address State Float -> EleBuf .
The first position stores the address of the call. The second position denotes
the state of the call. The third position stores the time of the first request of
the call and is used to compute the call duration.
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Messages. Actors process messages of sort Msg which are constructed using the
following operator
op _<-_ : Address Contents -> Msg .
The first parameter of sort Address specifies to which actor the message is di-
rected and the second parameter of sort Contents is the payload of the message.
An ActiveMsg is a timestamped Msg constructed using the following operator:
op {_,_} : Float Msg -> ActiveMsg .
The first parameter specifies the time when the paired message is to be pro-
cessed.
We assume that an active message {gt1,msg1} is always going to be pro-
cessed before an active message {gt2,msg2} whenever gt1 < gt2. This is ac-
complished by using a Scheduler as in [4, 24, 25]. A scheduler has sort Scheduler
and is constructed by the following operator
op [_|_] : Float ActiveMsgList -> Scheduler .
The first parameter is the global time while the second parameter contains the
list of active messages ordered by their delivery time. The following function re-
turns the scheduler obtained by inserting at the correct position, i.e., according
to the messages timestamp, a list of active messages into a given scheduler.
op insert : Scheduler ActiveMsgList -> Scheduler .
Configuration. A configuration of sort Config is a collection of Actors and
Scheduler:
subsort Actors < Config .
subsort Scheduler < Config .
op __ : Config Config -> Config [assoc comm id: none] .
For example, the initial configuratiom is defined by the equation:
eq initState =
<name: server | req-cnt: 0.0 , b-set: [0 | none], none >
<name: client-generate | server: server, cnt: 0 , none >
<name: attacker-generate | server: server, cnt: 0 , none >
[0.0 | {0.0, (attacker-generate <- spawn )} ;
{0.0, (client-generate <- spawn )} ;
{Ts, server <- ROUND}] .
It specifies a configuration with three actors: an attacker generator, a client gen-
eration and a server. The global time is 0.0 and there are three active messages
in the scheduler, the first two directed to the actors attacker-generate and
client-generate, respectively. Here we follow the Shared Channel Model [21]
where clients and attackers share the same channel. Thus the application does
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not distinguish malicious traffic from legitimate one as it is usually the case, in
particular, for the Coordinated Call attack.
Intuitively, the user specifies the rate at which new client and attacker ac-
tors are created. Then, for instance, when the message client-generate is
processed a new client actor is created and a new message client-generate
is scheduled so that a new client actor is created according to the rate given.
Similarly, when processing attacker-generate which creates a new attacker
actor and a new attacker-generate is scheduled to be processed according to
the attacker generating rate. These rewrite rules are omitted.
The third message scheduled at the time Ts is directed to the server which
is implementing the SeVen strategy establishing when a SeVen round ends.
The following function extracts the first scheduled active message in a sched-
uler and returns a new scheduler with the global time advanced to its delivery
time.
op mytick : Scheduler -> Config .
For instance, let msg be a message and SL an ActiveMsgList. Then
mytick([0.0 | {1.0,msg} ; SL])
returns msg [1.0 | SL] containing the message msg and the scheduler [1.0
| SL]. Intuitively, the message msg is going to be processed next. Message
processing is formalized by rewriting rules.
Selective Strategies. Finally, we specified the three selective strategies described
in Section 3, namely, Uniform, Roulette and Tournament. The function
op select : Float Buffer -> ActorBuffer .
implements one of the selective strategies. Given the global time and a buffer,
this function returns a pair of sort ActorBuffer with the actor name of the
selected element that has been selected to be removed and the resulting buffer
obtained by removing this element from the given buffer.
All selective strategies we formalized use the following function:
op sampleUniWithInt : Nat -> Nat
which for a given input n returns a random natural number between 0 and n.
The following function uses this function to select at random an element from
a given buffer and thus to implement the uniform selection strategy.
op selectRandom : Buffer -> EleBuf .
For the roulette strategy, we compute using the dropping factor
op roulette : Float Buffer -> EleBuf .
which creates a roulette by assigning weights to the elements of the buffer ac-
cording to the dropping factor and then randomly selects one.
A tournament for the n-tournament selection strategy is created by the fol-
lowing function:
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op creatingTour : NBuffer Nat Buffer -> Buffer .
It takes an NBuffer and a natural number, specifying the size of the tournament,
and accumulates the selected elements to the tournament in the third argument.
Once the tournament is created, we use the following function to select the one
with the greatest dropping factor:
op selectGreatest : Buffer -> EleBuf .
which takes a buffer with the tournament traversing it to find the element with
the greatest dropping factor.
4.2. Rewrite Rules
The rewrite rules modify elements from Conf and specify the operational
semantics of a system. We describe next the main rewrite rules used in our
formalization.
The first action we describe is when an actor receives a poll message indi-
cating that it should start a call at time gt + delay.
rl [CLIENT-RECEIVE-POLL] :
<name: c(i) | server: Ser, status: none, AS >
{c(i) <- poll} [gt | SL]
=>
<name: c(i) | server: Ser , status: invite, AS >
mytick(insert([gt | SL], { gt + delay, Ser <- INVITE(c(i))})) .
The following rewrite rule specifies the behavior of a client upon receiving a
RINGING message from the server. It changes the client’s state from invite to
connected and generates a message BYE, scheduled to be sent after some time.
This means that all legitimate clients do not overpass the average time of the
duration of calls using one of the call duration models, exponential or lognormal,
described in Section 3. This means that the client called c(i) is expected to
end its call at time gt + callDur(tMedio).
rl [CLIENT-RECEIVE-RINGING] :
<name: c(i) | server: Ser, status: invite, AS >
{c(i) <- RINGING} [gt | SL]
=>
<name: c(i) | server: Ser , status: connected, AS >
mytick(insert([gt | SL],
{ gt + callDur(tMedio), (Ser <- BYE(c(i)))})) .
SeVen may, however, drop a call before the call is finished. We classify such a call
as an incomplete call, i.e. the dropped client’s status is changed to incomplete.
We omit this rule.
The rewrite rules for the attackers are similar to the client rules. The only
difference is that no BYE message is generated, thus, specifying the Coordinated
Call attack where attackers attempt to stay in the call for indefinite time. We
elide these rules.
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crl [SeVen-RECEIVE-INVITE] :
<name: Ser | req-cnt: pmod , b-set: [lenB | B], AS >
{Ser <- INVITE(Actor)} [gt | SL]
=> if (lenB >= lenBufSeVen) then
if p1 then ConfAcc myTick(SchAcc)
else ConfRej myTick(SchRej)
fi
else ConfAcc2 mytick(SchAcc2)
fi
if p1 := sampleBerWithP(accept-prob(pmod))
/\ { ActorDr, bufDr } := select(gt,B)
/\ nBuf := add([lenB + (- 1) | bufDr], < Actor invite gt >)
/\ ConfAcc := <name: Ser | req-cnt: (pmod + 1.0), b-set: nBuf , AS >
/\ SchAcc := insert([gt | SL],
{gt, Actor <- TRYING} ; {gt, ActorDr <- poll})
/\ ConfRej := <name: Ser | req-cnt: (pmod + 1.0), b-set: [lenB | B], AS >
/\ SchRej := insert([gt | SL],
{gt + delay , Actor <- poll})
/\ b-setNu := add( [lenB | B], < Actor invite gt > )
/\ ConfAcc2 := <name: Ser | req-cnt: pmod , b-set: b-setNu, AS >
/\ SchAcc2 := insert([gt | SL], {gt + delay, Actor <- TRYING}) .
rl [SeVen-APP-ROUND] :
<name: Ser | req-cnt: pmod , b-set: [lenB | B], AS >
{Ser <- ROUND} [gt | SL]
=>
<name: Ser | req-cnt: 0.0, b-set: [lenB | B], AS >
mytick(insert([gt | SL],
{gt, reply(Ser, B, gt)} {gt + Ts, Ser <- ROUND})) .
Figure 3: Rewrite rules specifying SeVen’s selective strategy.
Figure 3 depicts the rules implementing SeVen’s strategy. For each INVITE
message received by some actor Actor, the rule SeVen-RECEIVE-INVITE checks
whether the buffer of the server reached its maximum. If not, then the incoming
request is added to the server’s buffer (ConfAcc2) and a message TRYING to the
corresponding actor is created. Otherwise, SeVen throws a coin (p1) to decide
whether the incoming request will be processed using pmod. If SeVen decides
to process the incoming request, then some request being processed is selected
to be dropped using the function select. It returns the name of the actor
ActorDr and the resulting buffer nBuf. The incoming request is added to nBuf
and pmod gets incremented, resulting in the configuration ConfAcc. Moreover,
a poll message to ActorDr and a TRYING to Actor are created specifying that
the connection is going to be terminated. Otherwise, the incoming request is
rejected and pmod is incremented without affecting the server’s buffer resulting
14
in the configuration ConfRej. A poll message to Actor is also created.
The rule SeVen-APP-ROUND specifies that when the round finishes, all sur-
viving WAITING requests in SeVen’s buffer are answered by the function reply.
Then a new round starts and pmod is re-set.
5. Simulations
We detail our simulation results obtained from our formal specification using
the statistical model checker PVeStA [8]. Our simulations are parametric in the
following values:
• Average time of a call – tM : This is the assumed average time of the
calls of honest users. For the simulations, we assumed tM = 5 time units;
• Dropping Factor – We assume the following values for the dropping factor
function (Equation 1):
– pIN = 2;
– pWAIT = 8;
– α = 1.89.
These values were chosen so that the dropping factor increases in a rea-
sonable fashion for calls with duration greater than tM . Sample values are
shown below, recalling that tM = 5 seconds:
Call Duration (mins) Dropping Factor
6 12.37
8 17.31
10 27.84
That is, dropping factor of a call with duration of 10 minutes, i.e., 2×tM , is
approximately 3 times greater than the dropping factor of a call whose status
is WAITING (27.84/8). This is a reasonable ratio. However, according to the
specific application other values can be set for pIN, pWAIT and α. Finally, the
choice of setting pWAIT = 4×pIN was selected so that the calls with duration
less than tM have much less chance of being dropped than the calls that are
still waiting for the responder.
• Size of Buffer – k: This is the upper-bound on the size of the server’s
buffer denoting the processing capacity of the application. k = 24;
• Rate of Calls (R): We fixed the total rate of calls to be R which is the
result of summing the rate of legitimate calls, RL, and the rate of attacker
calls, RA. That is, RL +RA = R.
The value of R is computed using standard techniques6 so that if RL = R,
i.e., the server is not under attack, then the server will not be overloaded.
With R fixed, we set RL and RA to be RL + RA = R, but considered
scenarios with different proportions for RA and RL. This reflects the fact
6Using the Erlang model which computes R by taking into account k and tM .
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that Coordinated Call attack uses low traffic and therefore, can bypass usual
defenses based on network traffic analysis which normally monitor the total
rate of calls R.
We considered 5 different proportions for RL and RA expressed in the per-
centage of the total number of calls R:
Legitimate Calls (RL) Attacker Calls (RA)
83% 17%
67% 33%
50% 50%
33% 67%
17% 83%
• Total time of the simulation – total: This is the total time of the
simulation using PVeStA. We used in our simulations total equal to 40 time
units, similar to the time used in [24];
• Delay of the Network: We also assumed a delay of 0.1 time units of
message in the network;
• Degree of confidence for the simulation: Our simulations were carried
out with a degree of confidence of 99% (see [27, 7] for more details on
statistical model checking).
Quality Measures. In our simulation, we use quality measures specific for VoIP
services. These are specified by expressions of the QuaTEx quantitative, prob-
abilistic temporal logic defined in [27]. We perform statistical model checking
of our defense in the sense of [7]: once a QuaTEx formula and desired degree of
confidence are specified, a sufficiently large number of Monte Carlo simulations
are carried out allowing for the verification of the QuaTEx formula. The Monte
Carlo simulations are carried out by the computational tool Maude [6] and the
statistical model checking is carried out by PVeStA.
The QuaTEx formulas, i.e., the quality measures, that we use in our simu-
lations are defined below. The operator© is a temporal modality that specifies
the advancement of the global time to the time of the next event (see [27] for
more details).
• Complete: How many honest calls were able to stay in the INCALL status
for the expected duration.
complete(total) = if time > total then countCompletecountHonest
else © complete(total)
where countComplete is a counter that is incremented whenever an honest
call is completed.
• Incomplete: How many honest calls were able to have the INCALL status
but were dropped before completing the call, i.e. not staying in INCALL
status for the expected duration;
incomplete(total) = if time > total then countIncompletecountHonest
else © incomplete(total)
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(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 4: Client Success Ratio: Simulation Results when not using SeVen.
where countIncomplete = countIncall−countComplete and countIncall is
a counter that is incremented whenever an honest calls changes from status
WAITING to INCALL.
• Unsuccessful: How many honest calls were not even able to reach the
INCALL status. That is, how many calls were not even able to start talking
between each other.
unsuccessful(total) = if time > total then countUnsuccessfulcountHonest
else © unsuccessful(total)
where countUnsuccessful = countHonest− countIncall.
• The average of client incomplete calls: We also measure the average propor-
tion of time legitimate clients were able to talk in an incomplete call before
they were dropped.
avgInCall(total) = if time > total then totalT imeInCalltotalIncompleteCall
else © avgInCall(total)
where totalT imeInCall is the sum of how much percent of time clients
were able to talk before being interrupted and the totalIncompleteCall is
the total of clients that were not able to finish their call.
We carried out simulations with the three different types of dropping strate-
gies described in Section 3, namely uniform, roulette and k2 -tournament. We
also carried out simulations with a scenario without SeVen.
5.1. No Defense
Our simulations results are depicted in Figure 4. They suggest that the
Coordinated Call attack is indeed effective in reducing the availability of a
VoIP service when assuming both an exponential and a lognormal call dura-
tion. Increasing the proportion of attackers rapidly increases the proportion of
Unsuccessful calls, i.e., calls that did not even start a conversation, while the
proportion of Complete calls falls. As expected there are no Incomplete calls as
the VoIP server does not interrupt calls.
5.2. Uniform Dropping Strategy
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(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
(c) Exponential Call Duration. (d) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 5: Client Success Ratio and Average Time of Incomplete Calls: Simulation Results
when a uniform dropping strategy.
Figure 5 depicts the results when using SeVen with a uniform dropping strat-
egy. It suggests that SeVen can indeed mitigate the Coordinated Call attack.
The proportion of Complete calls remains at high levels when assuming both
an exponential, above 60% of legitimate calls, and a lognormal call duration,
above 80%.
As SeVen may interrupt calls in the middle of a conversation, there are In-
complete calls, i.e., calls where the parties have started to communicate, but
were interrupted before communicating for the expected time. For exponential
call duration, around 30% of legitimate calls were interrupted, while for lognor-
mal call duration around 10% of legitimate calls were interrupted. However,
the average time of incomplete calls suggests that although these calls are in-
terrupted, they still are able to communicate for long periods of time, above
70% of the expected time for exponential call duration and above 89% of the
expected time for lognormal call duration.
5.3. Roulette Dropping Strategy
Figures 6 depicts our simulation results when using a roulette dropping strat-
egy. The results are similar to the results obtained with the uniform dropping
strategy. For exponential call duration, above 60% of legitimate calls were com-
pleted and around 30% were interrupted by SeVen. For lognormal call duration,
above 80% of legitimate calls were completed and around 10% were interrupted
by SeVen. Moreover, the interrupted calls stayed communicating in average
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(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
(c) Exponential Call Duration. (d) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 6: Client Success Ratio and Average Time of Incomplete Calls: Simulation Results
when a roulette dropping strategy.
above 70% of the expected call duration for exponential call duration and above
88% of the expected call duration for lognormal call duration.
5.4. k2 -tournament
Figures 7 and ?? depict the simulation results obtained by using a k2 -
tournament dropping strategy. They suggest that this strategy is better than
the roulette and uniform strategies. The proportion of complete calls is above
62% for exponential call duration and above 86% for lognormal call duration.
In other words, around 30% of legitimate calls were interrupted by SeVen when
assuming exponential call duration and around 10% of legitimate calls were
interrupted by SeVen when assuming lognormal call duration. Moreover, the
average time of incomplete calls is always greater than 72% for exponential call
duration and above 84% for lognormal call duration.
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(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
(c) Exponential Call Duration. (d) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 7: Client Success Ratio and Average Time of Incomplete Calls: Simulation Results
when using a roulette dropping strategy.
6. Experiments
In our experiments, we used Asterisk version 13.6.0 which is a SIP server
widely used by small and mid size companies for implementing their VoIP ser-
vices. We assume there are honest users and malicious attackers which try to
make the VoIP unavailable. Both the traffic of the honest users and the attack-
ers are emulated using the tool SIPp [20] version 3.4.1. SIPp generates calls
which may be configured as the caller or the callee. Thus, in our experiments,
we used pairs of SIPp, one pair for generating the honest user calls and the
other pair for generating the attacker calls. Finally, we developed the SeVen
proxy in C++ which implements the selective strategy described in Section 3.
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The figure above illustrates the topology of the experiments we carried out.
To make a call, the pairs of SIPp send messages to the SeVen proxy which on
the other hand forwards them to Asterisk. Similarly, any message generated
by Asterisk is forward to the SeVen proxy which then forwards them to the
corresponding users. Therefore, SeVen is acting as an Outbound Proxy for both
Asterisk and the pairs of SIPp. For our experiments, it is enough to use a single
machine. We used a machine with configuration Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4510U
CPU @ 2.00GHz and 8 GB of RAM.
Parameters. We use the following parameters to configure our experiments:
• Average Call Duration (tM) – We assume known what is the average
duration of calls. This can be determined in practice by analyzing the
history of calls. We assume in our experiments that tM = 160 seconds
(approximately 2.6 minutes);
• SIP Sever Capacity (k) – This is the number of simultaneous calls the
SIP server can handle. We set k = 200 which is a realistic capacity for a
small company allowing 400 users (2 × 200) to use the service at the same
time.
• Experiment Total Time (T ) – Each one of our experiments had a du-
ration of 60 minutes which corresponds to 3600 calls in each experiment.
With this duration, it was already possible to witness the damage caused
by the Coordinated Call Attack as well as the efficiency of our solution for
mitigating this attack.
• Traffic Rate (R) – Using a server with capacity of k, we calculated using
standard techniques [23] what would be a typical traffic of such a server.
It is R = 60 calls per minute. This value is computed using traditional
techniques [23] (Erlang model) taking into account k = 200 and tM = 160.
Thus the service can handle R legitimate calls per second. However, as
the attacker does not behave as legitimate placing calls with much greater
durations, the server can be subject to this attack.
In our experiments, we split this rate among clients and attackers. This is
because we want to emulate the fact that Coordinated Call attack can deny
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service using low traffic thus bypassing usual defenses [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]
based on network traffic analysis or monitoring the number of incoming
calls. This means that the total traffic (attacker + client) is always less or
equal than R.
The following graph illustrates client usage in normal conditions, i.e., with-
out suffering an attack, using the parameters as specified above.
It shows that the server is indeed well dimensioned for this rate of (legitimate)
calls. Clients occupy in average approximately 85% of Asterisk’s capacity thus
not overloading the server, but still being heavily used.
Finally, we set the duration of the calls generated by SIPp as follows:
• Total Call Duration of Clients: As described in Section 3, we used two
models for the call duration of legitimate client calls, namely the exponential
model suitable for non-VoIP calls and the lognormal model suitable for
VoIP calls. The parameters, λ, µ, σ, in Equations 2 and 3 were computed
as described in [11, 12] using the average call duration tM . Whenever we
generate a new call, we generate the call duration randomly according to
the used model (exponential or lognormal). SIPp ends the call when its
corresponding call duration is reached.
• Call Duration of Attackers: Following the Coordinated Call Attack, we
do not limit the call duration of an attacker call. His calls communicate for
indefinite time.
Quality Measures. For our experiments, we used the following three quality
measures for our calls:
• Complete Call: A call is complete whenever its status changed from
WAITING to INCALL and it is able to stay in status INCALL for its cor-
responding call duration. That is, the caller was able to communicate with
the responder for all the prescribed duration;
• Incomplete Call: A call is incomplete whenever its status changed from
WAITING to INCALL, but it was not able to stay in status INCALL for its
corresponding call duration. That is, the caller was interrupted before com-
pleting the call;
• Unsuccessful Call: A call is unsuccessful if it did not even change its
status from WAITING to INCALL. That is, the caller did not even have the
chance to speak with the responder.
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(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 8: Client Success Ratio: Experimental Results when not using SeVen.
Intuitively, complete calls are better than incomplete calls which are better
than unsuccessful calls. In order to support this claim, we also computed the
average duration call of the incomplete calls, that is, the time that users in
average were able to stay communicating before they were interrupted by SeVen.
6.1. Experimental Results
We carried out the corresponding experiments to the scenarios used in Sec-
tion 5. That is, we tested the efficiency of the Coordinated Call attack when
the server is not running any defense. We also carried out experiments with
scenarios using an exponential and lognormal call duration with the uniform,
roulette and 100-tournament dropping strategies.
6.1.1. No Defense
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate our main results when assuming exponential and
lognormal call duration and not using any defense mechanism. Our results
demonstrate the efficiency of the Coordinated Call attack. We observed that
the VoIP availability decreases considerably when increasing the proportion of
attacker calls in the rate R (Figure 8). In particular, the number of unsuccessful
call increases to level near 100%, while the number of completed calls falls to
close to 0%. Moreover, there are no incomplete calls, which is expected since
no calls are interrupted.
We also measured the number of attacker calls that the server serves during
the experiment (Figure 9). As expected from the profile of the Coordinated
Call attack, the attacker is able to deny service by slowly (after 10 minutes)
occupying all the available calls in the server and therefore deny its service to
legitimate clients.
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Figure 9: Attacker Call Occupancy in Buffer: Experimental Results when not using SeVen.
6.1.2. Uniform Defense
(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
(c) Exponential Call Duration. (d) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 10: Client Success Ratio and Average Time of Incomplete Calls: Experimental Results
when SeVen and a uniform dropping strategy.
We carried out experiments to test the efficiency of SeVen when using a
uniform dropping strategy. Our results are summarized in Figures 10 and 11.
The graphs depicted in Figure 10 show that SeVen when using a uniform
dropping strategy can mitigate the Coordinated Call attack. The results assum-
ing a lognormal call duration is slightly better than the results when assuming
an exponential call duration. In both cases, the proportion of completed calls
stayed above 50% levels even when the attacker call rate is 5 times more than
the client call rate. The proportion of incomplete calls was more affected by
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Figure 11: Attacker Call Occupancy in Buffer: Experimental Results when using SeVen with
a uniform dropping strategy.
the call duration model. Under the exponential call duration assumption, the
proportion of incomplete call was around 35% of all legitimate calls, while under
the lognormal call duration assumption, the proportion of incomplete calls was
of around 28%. The proportion of unsuccessful calls stays below 10% under
both assumptions of call duration. We also measured the average time of in-
complete calls, that is, the proportion of time that incomplete calls were able
to stay in a call before they were dropped by the SeVen defense strategy. When
assuming both an exponential call duration and a lognormal call duration, the
incomplete calls were in average around 40% of the expected call time.
Figure 11 illustrates how the attacker is able to occupy the resources of the
server. While when not running SeVen the attacker was able to occupy all
the server’s resources (Figure 9), when using SeVen with a uniform dropping
strategy, the attacker is only able to occupy around 70% of the server’s resources.
This may seem to be a high value, but the graph hides the fact that attackers are
dropped by the defense strategy and thus the high levels of availability obtained.
6.1.3. Roulette Defense
Figures 12 and 13 depict our experimental results when using SeVen with the
roulette dropping strategy. As with the uniform dropping strategy, the defense
was able to mitigate the Coordinated Call attack. Furthermore, the roulette
strategy performed better than the uniform strategy.
The availability depicted in Figure 12 remained at high levels under both
assumptions on call duration (exponential and lognormal). The proportion of
completed calls was above 70% percent when assuming an exponential call du-
ration and above 75% when assuming a lognormal call duration. In both cases,
the proportion of incomplete calls was less than 6%. We also measured the
average time of incomplete calls. They show that these calls were able to com-
municate for more than 50% of the expected time. These results are better than
the results obtained using a uniform dropping strategy.
Despite the availability results using the roulette strategy being better than
the availability results obtained using the uniform strategy, the attacker was
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(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
(c) Exponential Call Duration. (d) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 12: Client Success Ratio and Average Time of Incomplete Calls: Experimental Results
when using SeVen with a roulette dropping strategy.
still able to occupy a similar proportion of the server’s resource as depicted
in Figure 13. It occupied at most 70% of the server’s resources. Intuitively,
the difference in the availability between the uniform and roulette strategies is
because the roulette strategy tends to drop calls with greater duration. This
means that the attacker calls are more likely to be selected leaving more chance
for a legitimate call to access the service.
Figure 13: Attacker Call Occupancy in Buffer: Experimental Results when using SeVen with
a roulette dropping strategy.
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(a) Exponential Call Duration. (b) Lognormal Call Duration.
(c) Exponential Call Duration. (d) Lognormal Call Duration.
Figure 14: Client Success Ratio and Average Time of Incomplete Calls: Experimental Results
when using SeVen with a 100-tournament dropping strategy.
6.1.4. 100-Tournament Defense
Our last set of experiments evaluated the efficiency of SeVen with a 100-
tournament dropping strategy. Figures 14 and 15 depict our main results. The
100-tournament dropping strategy resulted in the best results when compared
with the uniform and roulette strategies.
The attacker was still able to use roughly the same amount of resources of the
server as when using the uniform and roulette strategy, namely around 70% of its
resources as depicted in Figure 13. Moreover, the availability results depicted
in Figure 14 were slightly better than the results obtained with the roulette
strategy (Figure 12). In both assumptions of call duration (following an expo-
nential and a lognormal distributions), SeVen was able to maintain high levels
of availability. More than 70% (respectively, 80%) of calls were completed when
assuming call duration following an exponential distribution (respectively, log-
normal distribution). The proportion of incomplete calls reached levels around
25% of all calls when assuming an exponential cal duration and reached 16%
of all calls when assuming lognormal call duration. Thus, more than 95% of all
legitimate calls were able to reach the incall status, which means that they were
able to communicate.
Finally, incomplete calls were interrupted by SeVen after communicating
more than 60% of the expected time when assuming exponential call duration
and more than 50% when assuming lognormal call duration.
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Figure 15: Attacker Call Occupancy in Buffer: Experimental Results when using SeVen with
a 100-tournament dropping strategy.
6.2. Impact of Using SeVen When not Suffering an Attack
We investigate additionally the impact of using SeVen as a proxy and imple-
menting the selective strategy on the performance of Asterisk. Asterisk modules
provide many statistics on the performance of the system. The following tables
contain the number of requests according to the time intervals for the time to
respond (TTR) when using and not using SeVen during normal situation, that
is, when only receiving legitimate calls.
Not Using SeVen
TTR (ms) [0, 1] [3,4] [4,5] [8,9] [10,20]
Num Requests 1837 1 960 2 2
Using SeVen
TTR (ms) [0, 1] [3,4] [4,5] [7,8] [10,20] [20,30] [30,40] [40,50] [50,100] [100,150]
Num Requests 19 2 404 341 657 434 148 96 70 8
As one can observe, there is an impact to TTR when using SeVen. While
without SeVen most of the requests are responded within 5ms, with SeVen, most
of the requests are responded within 100ms.
Such a delay does not greatly impact user experience as 100 ms is negligible
with respect to the time users wait until establishing a call, e.g., waiting until
Bob accepts the call which normally takes some seconds to happen. Moreover,
as SeVen only acts on SIP messages (Initiation and Termination phases of Fig-
ure 1), SeVen does not affect user experience when the parties are in a call
(Communication Phase in Figure 1).
Finally, it seems possible to improve SeVen’s performance by improving our
implementation, e.g., implementing it as a module instead of a proxy. This is
left, however, to future work.
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7. Comparison between Simulation and Experimental Results
7.1. Differences between Simulations and Experiments
There are some important differences between the formal model and the
experimental set-up. For a starter, the formal specification abstracts several
aspects present in the experimental set-up. For example:
• We did not model how Asterisk actually manages its workers/threads. As-
terisk has a number of modules that among other things, maintain call
statistics, convert calls encoded some codex to another, etc;
• In our experiments, there are other applications running in parallel with
Asterisk that have to compete for resources (CPU and network interface for
example). Our formal model does not incorporate this;
• We use a simplified model for network latency with constant latency time;
• While the parameters, e.g., k, incoming client and attacker traffic, used
in the simulations were proportional to the parameters used in the experi-
ments, they were much lower to the ones used in the experimental results.
If we used the actual values for these parameters, simulations would have
taken much longer;
• In our experiments, SeVen is used as a proxy, while in our formal model the
defense was incorporated into the application.
Despite these important differences/abstractions, as we compare in more
detail next, the simulation results corresponded to many of the experimental
results. For example in terms of availability, i.e., proportion of completed,
incomplete and unsuccesful calls, the simulation results correctly indicated the
power of the attack and the efficiency of SeVen mitigating this attack. They
also correctly indicated which dropping strategy is better and how availability
changes with the increase on the attack rate. The simulation results were less
accurate in predicting the time of incomplete calls reaching a difference of 30%.
The reasons for this discrepancy are not completely clear, but we believe it has
to do with the abstractions mentioned above. We leave this investigation to
future work.
7.2. Detailed Comparisons
Typically each simulation takes about 30 seconds to be completed. In con-
trast, each experiment carried out on the network took 60 minutes. This means
that specifiers can quickly test different selective strategies using formal verifica-
tion before implementing the necessary machinery and carrying out experiments.
Once a selective strategy is shown by formal verification to have reasonable re-
sults, experiments can be carried out to validate the chosen defense.
In this section, we compare the results obtained through formal verifica-
tion detailed in Section 5 and the results obtained by carrying out experiments
detailed in Section 6. In general, availability results obtained through formal
verification indeed corresponded to our experimental results showing a high
degree of accuracy for our simulation results.
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Efficiency of the Coordinated Call Attack: Our simulation results with the sce-
nario without defense showed that the Coordinated Call is effective if the server
does not have any defense mechanism under both assumptions of duration calls
(exponential and lognormal). This result was also observed in our experimental
results. Figure 16 on the service availability illustrates this correspondence.
(a) Simulation. (b) Experiment.
Figure 16: Client Success Ratio: Comparison between simulation and experimental results for
lognormal call duration.
Efficiency of SeVen: All our simulations results using scenarios with SeVen
indicated that SeVen is indeed a good defense for mitigating the Coordinated
Call attack. The greater proportion of calls were completed calls, while a smaller
proportion of the calls were incomplete and a minority of calls were unsuccessful.
The same behavior was observed by our experiments. This is illustrated by
Figure 17.
(a) Simulation. (b) Experiment.
Figure 17: Client Success Ratio: Comparison between simulation and experimental results for
lognormal call duration when using SeVen with a tournament dropping strategy.
Dropping Strategies Evaluation: Our simulations were able to predict that the
tournament dropping strategy would perform best. However, it was not able
to forecast that the roulette strategy would perform better than the uniform
strategy. It is not clear to us why this was the case.
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Better Performance for Lognormal Call Duration: Our simulations results also
predicted that selective strategies would perform better in scenarios where call
duration of legitimate clients follows a lognormal distribution, such as in VoIP
communication, than scenarios with exponential call duration, such as in tradi-
tional telephony. This was the case independent on the dropping strategy used
(uniform, roulette or k2 -tournament). The same behavior was observed in our
experimental results.
Average time of Incomplete Calls: Our simulations results also indicated that
the average time that incomplete calls stayed communicating before being drop
by SeVen was relatively high: more than 80% of the expected time when using
the tournament strategy under a lognormal call duration. This results diverged
from the experimental results which observed an average time of incomplete
calls of around 60%. This is illustrated by Figure 18.
(a) Simulation. (b) Experiment
Figure 18: Average Time of Incomplete Calls: Comparison between simulation and experi-
mental results when using SeVen with the k
2
-tournament dropping strategy.
However, for other scenarios, the difference between simulation and experi-
mental results was greater reaching 30% of difference. It is not clear to us what
are the reasons for this difference. We suspect that the modeling of the time
delays should be improved. In any case, our results suggest that while simula-
tions provide quite accurate results on availability, it is less accurate on specific
timing analysis. We observed a similar behavior during our experiments and
simulations when modeling our defense for mitigating Application-Layer DDoS
attacks [4].
8. Related and Future Work
This paper formalized a new selective defense, called SeVen, for mitigating
Coordinated Call attacks. We have shown that using state-dependent proba-
bility distributions for selecting which calls are to be processed results in high
levels of availability. We proposed three defenses based on the dropping strat-
egy method (uniform, roulette and k2 -tournament). We carried out simulations
and experiments assuming traditional telephony and VoIP communications. In
both cases, we observed that our SeVen was able to mitigate the Coordinated
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Call attack. Finally, we compared the results obtained using our formal analysis
with the results obtained by experimentation obtaining a high accuracy. This
further supports the value of formal analysis during the development of selective
defenses for mitigating DoS attacks.
Most of the existing work [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33] on mitigating DoS attacks on
VoIP services focuses on flooding attacks, such as the SIP-Flooding attack. They
analyze the network traffic and whenever they observe an abrupt increase in the
traffic load, they activate their defenses. The network traffic is usually modeled
using some statistical approach, such as correlating the number of INVITE
requests and the number of requests that completed the SIP initiation phase [28]
or using more complicated metrics such as Helling distance to monitor traffic
probability distributions [29, 30, 31]. Other solutions place a lower priority on
INVITE messages, which are only processed when there are no other types of
request to be processed [32, 33].
As the Coordinated Call Attack emulates legitimate client traffic not causing
an unexpected sudden increase in traffic, all these defenses are not effective in
mitigating the Coordinated Call Attack. The few solutions we found in the
literature for this type of attack are commercial tools that act as a firewall which
monitor all the call traffic and the signaling [34, 35] or analyze audio samples [36]
in order to differentiate the fraudulent calls from the legitimate ones. Less
sophisticated mechanisms [37] monitors all the incoming requests and reject
those whose IPs do not belong to a list of trusted IPs. Clearly such approaches
does not work well when the attackers are malicious users whose IPs are in
the trusted list and are not using automation to make the calls. In addition,
these commercial tools can be expensive for small businesses to purchase and
maintain, and they require technical expertise for proper installation.
One main advantage of our proposed solution is that it is not tailored using
many specific assumptions on type of service. The only assumption used is a
previous knowledge of the average call duration, which can be easily inferred
from the service call history. Moreover, our solution can be easily integrated
with other mechanisms such as the IP filtering approach used in [37].
[38] proposes a filtering mechanism for SIP flooding attacks. It is not clear
whether such mechanisms will be enough for mitigating the Coordinated VoIP
attack, as the number of messages needed to carry out such attack is much
less. Wu et al. [39] have proposed a mechanism to identify intruders using SIP
by analyzing the traffic data. Although we do not tackle the identification of
intruders problem, we find it an interesting future direction.
The formalization of DDoS attacks and their defenses has been subject of
other papers. For example, Meadows proposed a cost-based model in [40], while
others use branching temporal logics [41]. This paper takes the approach used in
[42, 25, 24], where one formalizes the system in Maude and uses the Statistical
Model Checker PVeStA to carry out analyses. While [42, 25, 24] modeled tra-
ditional DDoS attacks exploiting stateless protocols on the transport/network
layers, we are modeling stateful Application Layer DDoS attacks. Moreover,
the quality measures used for VoIP services under TDoS attacks, described in
Section 3, are different to the quality measures considered in the previous work.
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More recently [4], we proposed SeVen showing that it can be used to mitigate
ADDoS attacks that exploit the HTTP protocol. This paper shows that SeVen
can also be used to mitigate DDoS attacks in VoIP protocols, but in order to
do so one needs state-dependent probabilistic distributions. This is because of
the quality requirements that we need in VoIP communications. We would like
to give a priority to the types of call that should be given more chances to keep
using resources of the server. In particular, we give preference to calls that do
not take more than the average duration time. Such quality measures are not
present in HTTP protocols that we analyzed in [4].
For future work, we are going to investigate the mitigating of other types
of attacks, such as volumetric and amplification attacks. We are also thinking
on intrusion detection mechanisms. We are also interested in building defenses
for mitigating amplification attacks [18]. We have also been using SeVen for
mitigating High-Rate ADDoS attacks using Software Defined Networks [43].
We are also investigating ways to improve simulation accuracy by improving
the modeling of timing aspects of the system, such as processing and network
delay.
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